Twenty three years ago on January 2nd, 2002, I found myself at a street market in Paris with the remnants of a New Year’s Eve hangover and a wad of Francs. Of course, the headache I was suffering was nothing compared to the headaches of those shopkeepers manning the stands who were now required to take my crumpled paper money and coins, figure and issue my change in Euros.
Twenty five years then (give or take), provides a unique vantage point to explore the ongoing fate of the global currency market: indeed, in one sense we are starting at the beginning (the various currencies in the European Monetary Union became officially fixed to the Euro in 1999) of the second most traded currency in the world after the US Dollar. However, we’re actually starting in the middle: while January 2002 was a radical historical change, the history it was disrupting was not all that old: the origins of the modern currency market and the Euro date to the early 70s and a 1973 agreement among European nations in the G-10.
The Birth of the Modern Currency Market
From 1944 until 1971, the US and 44 allied nations participated in something called the Bretton-Woods System. Bretton-Woods, worked out in the shadow of the conflict, essentially established a series of fixed exchange rates for members’ currency, which were all (essentially) pegged to the dollar which could be in turn exchanged for gold at a congressionally mandated 35 dollars an ounce. (Noted economist John Maynard Keynes, in a move that could be viewed as prefiguring the clamor for some sort of crypto as global reserve currency, argued for an entirely new invented currency “the bancor”). As the U.S.’s political and fiscal institutions, and infrastructure had largely escaped WWII unscathed, it made sense for the various economies recovering from the impacts of the War to tie their currencies to the stable structures of the United States.
Challenges in the Bretton-Woods System
Not all was smooth sailing in the early days: given that it was essentially the only game in town, the global community was mostly buying US products and there started to be a shortage of US dollars worldwide (outside of the US). This is partially where the Marshall Plan came in– which from a currency perspective involved sending the US dollar out to European nations. Indeed, it took about 15 years to fully establish Bretton Woods and it wasn’t fully operational until 1958.
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However, once these nations recovered from the war and the U.S. started running a trade deficit, there came another issue known as the Triffin Dilemma, quoting the IMF:
If the United States stopped running balance of payments deficits, the international community would lose its largest source of additions to reserves. The resulting shortage of liquidity could pull the world economy into a contractionary spiral, leading to instability. If U.S. deficits continued, a steady stream of dollars would continue to fuel world economic growth. However, excessive U.S. deficits (dollar glut) would erode confidence in the value of the U.S. dollar. Without confidence in the dollar, it would no longer be accepted as the world’s reserve currency. The fixed exchange rate system could break down, leading to instability.
This difficulty was compounded by the fact that the original Bretton-Woods agreement likely undervalued gold at 35 dollars an ounce.
The United States spent much of the 1960s trying to duct tape together solutions for this dilemma (as it continued to import goods from the newly burgeoning post-war economies). These attempts included both classic diplomacy– for instance, indicating to Germany that if they attempted to pull large amounts of Gold from the U.S. reserves, the U.S. would likely respond by limiting military support. There were also multi-polar agreements: including a Gold Pool where central banks pooled their reserves to keep the price of gold around $35 an ounce and extending IMF credit to the United States. Finally, the U.S. engaged in old fashioned capital controls by taxing capital outflows in 1963. Perhaps the most successful technique was the swap network, which was a series of futures contracts between the U.S. and other central banks.

However, these didn’t work as well as hoped and, the limited supply of global gold (mining wasn’t bringing up enough to resupply the U.S. reserves), meant the U.S. gold reserves could be depleted as well. Moreover, continuing operations in Vietnam and ongoing expansion of the U.S. social programs meant the U.S. started running larger deficits, a key worry in the Triffin scenario. In 1968, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler confessed: “Providing reserves and exchanges for the whole world is too much for one country and one currency to bear.”
Moreover, the European governments looked at the centrality of US dollar as enriching the U.S. at the expense of themselves. In response, the late 1960s and 1970s saw attempts to form a grouping of European countries to regulate the fluctuations of their currencies amongst themselves (the famous “snake in the tunnel”). These meetings failed to get off the ground in the 1970s but finally got fully underway in the late 1980s, before establishing the European Central Bank in 1998 and fixing the exchange rates of the 11 currencies in the European Monetary Union.
Despite the decline of the dollar and the rise of the euro, the US dollar is still the global reserve currency: though not exclusively (it now accounts for approximately 60% of the global currency reserves, the euro is roughly 20%). Such a state is not guaranteed as it was during the Bretton-Woods era; moreover, the US Dollar is not pegged to gold as it was during that era (though this recent article highlights that central banks are buying gold as a reserve currency hedge). Instead, the USD (and most major currencies) float against one another.
The Future of Global Reserve Currencies
This history lesson could help us understand a couple of key questions going forward as regards the currency market. The first is that many purchasers of crypto currencies hold forth that one day they could be the global reserve currency. However, the very thing that makes them attractive as an investment (“Number go up” as Zeke Faux noted in his book of the same title), are what hinders them as a reserve currency which needs to be a stable store of value– if one redeems a dollar for a crypto coin today and that same crypto coin is worth two dollars tomorrow and 50 cents next week, it won’t stabilize the markets in the way a reserve currency is supposed to. Moreover, the notion of creating confidence in a system that is currently so rife with fraud takes the principal problem of Keynes’ idea for the “bancor”– building confidence in a new global reserve currency and multiplies it.
Second, there are frequently worries about the global trade deficit (the US imports more than it exports). Worries about the global trade deficit are frequently built on several misunderstandings. Those who focus on the trade deficit mostly focus on the imbalances of “goods” which neglects that the U.S. is a significant exporter of services to the rest of the globe in a way that is more significant than it was in the 1960s. In the same vein, a great deal of the (mis)understanding of the dangers of the trade deficit is a legacy of the 1960s, specifically Triffin dilemma. With the U.S. no longer required to redeem the dollar for gold or other currencies, we no longer have to worry about depleting our reserves because of this trade deficit as we did in the 1960s. Additionally. Ultimately, with the U.S. no longer required to redeem the dollar for gold or other currencies, we no longer have to worry about depleting our reserves because of this trade deficit as we did in the 1960s and our outgoing services help balance this goods deficit. We can simply print more: while this may cause further problems, we needn’t worry that we’ll run out of gold and suddenly default as the world’s global reserve currency.
The final item is the rate of economic growth and is one that will most shape exchange rates over the next year and going forward (unless the U.S. wants to engage in direct currency manipulation, which hasn’t been mentioned even in Trump’s most interventionist suggestions). Should economic policies in the United States continue the strong economic growth that emerged out of Covid, we could see the United States’ currency strengthen against those of the rest of the world. Or conversely, should a strong U.S. economy mean we will continue to see higher interest rates compared to the rest of the world, we would see the U.S. dollar remain strong in comparison with the rest of the world. The danger is that should the U.S. retreat from global trade and emerge as more protectionist, we could see the importance of the dollar as the global reserve currency decline. The United States is too central to the world’s economic system to fully move out of international trade, but moves in this direction would hurt the dollar’s long-term strength and would increase the importance of the rest of the world’s currencies as stable reserves.
Key Takeaways
- Origins of Modern Currency Markets
The Euro and floating currency systems evolved from the collapse of the Bretton-Woods System (1944-1971). - Triffin Dilemma’s Legacy
U.S. deficits boosted global liquidity but risked undermining the dollar’s reserve currency status during Bretton-Woods. - Dollar vs. Euro
The U.S. Dollar remains the dominant reserve currency (60%), despite the rise of the Euro (20%).
- Cryptocurrency Limitations
Volatility and lack of trust prevent cryptocurrencies from functioning as global reserve currencies. - Trade Deficits Today
The U.S. no longer faces gold-backed currency risks; economic growth now drives exchange rate dynamics.
